How does the entrance of radical candidates influence election results? Conventional wisdom suggests that extreme candidates merely split the votes. Based on the range effect theory in cognitive psychology, we hypothesize that the entrance of an extreme candidate reframes the endpoints of the ideological spectrum among available candidates, which makes the moderate one on the same side to be perceived by the voters as even more moderate. Through two survey experiments in the United States and Taiwan, we provide empirical support for range effect in the vote choice in the plurality system. The results imply that a mainstream party can, even without changing its own manifesto, benefit from the entrance of its radical counterpart; it explains why the mainstream party may choose cooperation strategically. Our findings also challenge the assumption in regression models that the perceived ideological positions of candidates are independent of each other.
Introduction i
The emergence of radical wing candidates in electoral races has become a global phenomenon in recent times.
ii For example, the UK Independence Party (UKIP) in the United Kingdom, National Front (FN) in France, and the China Unification Promotion Party in Taiwan all evidenced the extension of existing ideological spectrums in each country (For review, see Kitschelt and McCann 2005, or Mair 2007) . This study investigates the effects of extreme candidates' appearance in electoral contests, especially regarding how they influence supporters of the mainstream parties.
Traditional theories of voting behavior suggest that people vote for candidates who are closer to themselves on the ideological spectrum. According to the spatial models, the entrance of extreme left or right wing candidates into electoral races does nothing more than splitting the vote from their moderate counterparts. For instance, many people still blame Ralph Nader as the spoiler candidate who caused Al Gore's defeat to George W.
Bush in the 2000 presidential election (Herron and Lewis 2007).
However, mainstream parties' reactions vary considerably to the entrance of extreme candidates. Some mainstream parties diverge from the median point to prevent the entry of a new party (Palfrey 1984) . After all, it is easier for mainstream parties to appease and to absorb newcomers, for example by including candidates with diverse backgrounds in the party list or providing more credible promises. On the contrary, other mainstream parties do not necessarily try to block those radical competitors on the same side of the political spectrum. Are these radical wing candidates harmful or beneficent to the mainstream parties, especially to those on the same side?
Studies of cognitive psychology indicate that individuals' preference is contextdependent, primarily influenced by the range of options (Parducci 1965) . While the stimuli -a new option -becomes available, individuals will re-access the end values first, and accordingly evaluate the stimuli as well as the existing options. The range effect has been found in various fields such as psychophysics (Laberge and Brown 1986) and marketing (Simonson and Tversky 1992) .
With the rise of the extreme parties and candidates in the recent decades, the range effect also draws attention to political scientists. Simonovits (2017) shows that the appearance of non-moderate policy options reshapes the subject's preferences among the existing policies. Furthermore, Waismel-Manor and Simonovits (2017) find that, in the context of Israeli general election, voters consider the full spectrum of candidates and parties in the competition, while the entrance of radical candidates will change the respondents' perception on the existing actors.
Our study continues to answer several essential puzzles regarding range effect and voting behavior. Importantly, we examine whether the range effect appears in different institutional contexts. We propose to study the range effect in another essential and generalizable setting: the two-party system in the single-member-district (SMD).
Intuitively, the competition in SMD is similar to the original study of range effect and many other related experiments: two main rivals and a third incoming competitor. Therefore, testing the range effect theory in a two-party system does not need extra assumptions such as the number of existing competitors in the Israeli case in Waismel-Manor and Simonovits (2017) .
By conducting survey experiment in two countries with similar electoral and party systems, the United States and Taiwan, we show that the entrance of a politically radical candidate can be, contrary to conventional wisdom, beneficial to their mainstream counterpart in specific scenarios. Even though an extreme candidate may split votes among radical supporters, their entrance into an electoral contest also stimulates "extremeness aversion effect" (Simonson and Tversky 1992; Tversky and Simonson 1993 ) among the moderate voters, which may increase the vote share of the mainstream candidate on the same side.
Our empirical results challenges (again) the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) assumption implicitly acknowledged in the spatial models and multinomial regression models. Besides, the results also reveal a possible strategy that a major party prefer: cognitively changing voters' perception toward it without changing its policy stance practically.
Range Effect, Extremeness Aversion, and Spatial Voting
When making choices, individuals' preferences are contextual-dependent. People do not evaluate each option independently nor assign constant utility to each of them.
Instead, people often make comparisons among the available options in the choice set, which is called range effect (Parducci 1965) . Based on this cognitive psychological mechanism, studies in various fields have shown that the range effects do exist (e.g., Laberge and Brown 1986; Yeung and Soman 2005) .
In many cases, individuals tend to make extremeness-averse choices: when a third extreme choice becomes the new endpoint on one side, subjects re-evaluate the existing option at the same side as more moderate (Simonson and Tversky 1992) . It is worth noticing that this influence is asymmetric -the new extreme option would influence only the moderate option on the same side, but not the other one which is still the other endpoint of the spectrum. 
Case Selection
To examine the range effect in the political arena, we designed two survey experiments in two democracies embedded in two distinct political cultures: the United
States and Taiwan. Taiwan and the United States both have presidential elections and firstpast-the-post voting for the heads of local governments as well as district-level national legislators. These shared characteristics may provide us with the opportunity to examine and compare the generalizability of our findings.
Our first experiment was conducted in the United States concerning the liberalconservative spectrum. Since the US had a well-developed bipartisan system and SMD rule, it fits our theoretical requirement. Besides, the primary political spectrum in the United States has been constructed along with the liberal-conservative spectrum in recent decades (Poole and Rosenthal 2001; McCarty et al. 2005) . However, some studies using American subjects in cross-sectional surveys find a weak range effect because there can be, to some extent, multiple policy issues present in each presidential election (see, e.g., Herne Tsai was defeated by the incumbent Ma Ying-Jeou from the Kuomintang (KMT hereafter).
It is believed that Tsai's loss could be attributed to people's perception of her proindependence attitude on the cross-strait relationship with China, even though she claimed that she espoused the moderate position (Sullivan 2013) .
In 2016 presidential and legislative elections, DPP cooperated closely with another extreme pro-independence party, the New Power Party (NPP) -which has emerged after the Sunflower Movement in 2014 -to run in the legislative election in some single-member districts (Hickey and Niou 2017) . Besides, in some districts, both DPP and other small parties with similar pro-independence preference nominated their own candidates, respectively; but Tsai did not openly criticize these potential conflicts (Fell 2016 However, the policy stance and campaign of a party are usually determined by the party leader or caucus, especially when there is a concurrent election (Taiwan started to hold the presidential and legislative election concurrently since 2012). Even though we test the range effect at district-level, we argue that the party leaders would consider how the policy stance of their party will influence their vote share across the districts in general. In other words, range effect in the district may be accumulated and influential to the national politics.
Research Design and Data Collection
Survey experiment is needed for clarifying causal relationships between range effect and voting behaviors. If we analyzed the election results by ad hoc surveys, it would be difficult to identify how the mainstream parties and their smaller counterparts interact with each other. To be specific, the major party may actively shift toward the center and suffered the blame for inconsistency before the entrance of a politically extreme party. Also, the new parties may try their best to create new issue dimension (Meguid 2015) 
US subjects, MTurk, and the Congressional Election
To deal with these empirical challenges, we designed two survey experiments. One experiment was conducted through Amazon MTurk on July 15-20, 2016. Subjects need to be over the age of 18, using a US IP address and have a 95% approval rating or higher for previous hits. Subjects were invited to participate in a survey related to politics and lifestyle and would receive $1.25 after completion. Overall, 509 subjects were recruited through Amazon MTurk, even though in our announcement we only asked for 500. Table 1 shows the socio-demographic background of the Mturkers in the first experiment. Generally speaking, the MTurkers we recruited are young, highly educated, non-black, and proliberal. Before the treatments, subjects were asked to locate their ideological position on a 0 to 100 scale from extremely liberal (0) to extremely conservative (100). Therefore, their self-report position was not influenced by our research treatments.
[ Table 1 ]
Subjects were firstly asked to report their routine political behaviors including news consumption, political interest, and political discussion. Before the treatment, they were asked to locate their ideology on a 0 to 100 liberal-conservative scale. After asking participants to self-report ideology, we put an attention check item before the primary treatment to filter out inattentive subjects. The item apprantly asks subjects to report their mood, but actually requires them to select "none of the above" in the last sentences of the item description. This method is proven to successfully increase the quality of data and enhance the attention of subjects on Internet surveys (Oppenheimer et al. 2009; Berinsky et al. 2014) . Overall, 499 (98.03%) of our 509 subjects passed the attention check, and those who failed (10, 1.97%) were dropped from the analysis.
Subjects were then randomly assigned into three different groups. In the Control Group (n=100), they were asked to read the candidate bulletin of one Congressional The policies of all candidates we used in the U.S. experiment were generated from a pilot survey from 58 political science undergraduate students. Students were asked through open questions to nominate one policy they would describe as "extremely liberal,"
"moderate liberal," "extremely conservative," and "moderate conservative," respectively.
Students received course credits after completion. The policies nominated more than ten times by students in each category were selected as candidates' policy statements. Since we wanted to enhance the external validity of our experiment, wordings of the policies are extracted from speeches that politicians made or policy statements that were announced on candidates' official websites.
Apart from party and policies, candidate's name, age, level of education, photo, and ballot position were all randomized. All candidates were middle-aged white males; in the 2014 election cycle, 75% of all candidates running for office were male, and 82% were white.
In Treatment Group A (n=200), the bulletin includes three candidates: Republican, Democratic, and Independent. The extreme conservative (Ext-Con) independent candidate's three policy statements included relaxing gun ownership, free market on health-care, and ending abortion. In Treatment Group B (n=198), the extreme-liberal (ExtLib) independent candidate supported universal single-payer health care, free tuition to all college students, and women's full right to reproductive choice. Wordings of the extreme candidates' policy statements are extracted from the Libertarian Party and the Green Party in the U.S., respectively. Subjects in control and treatment groups were then asked to judge the liberal-conservative positions of the two or three candidates on a 0-100 liberalconservative scale. Their vote choice among the candidates was also asked.
After the treatment, subjects were then asked to report their party identification, political participation, belief in democracy, and previous experience on political engagement for other research propose. In the end, subjects were asked about their gender, age, race, the level of education, and household income. We do not expect the treatments would influence one's report on its previous political behaviors or demographic background because the question is related to experience or fact instead of attitude. These variables were then used for the randomization check and covariate adjustment. After the survey, all subjects were debriefed that the assigned candidate bulletin was entirely made up by researchers.
Taiwan subjects, PTT, and the Legislative Elections
To examine the external validity of range effect, our research design in the second survey experiment in Taiwan is almost parallel to the former one. This survey experiment was conducted on March 19-31, 2016, two months after its presidential election. The recruitment ads were posted on PTT Bulletin Board System, the biggest online discussion forum in Taiwan. vi Subject needed to be over 18 and living in Taiwan. Subjects were invited to participate in a survey related to politics and lifestyle, and would join the lottery for 30 convenience store gift cards valued NTD $100 (about USD $3) after completion.
Overall 427 subjects were recruited on PTT. Table 2 shows the socio-demographic background of respondents in the second experiment. As is discussed above, the majority of our Taiwanese respondents are young, highly educated, and self-reported proindependence before the treatment.
[ Table 2 ]
Subjects were first asked to report their routine political behaviors including news consumption, political interest, and political discussion. They were then requested to evaluate their attitude toward independence-unification on a 0-100 scale in which 0 means pro-unification, and 100 means pro-independence. Again, we put an attention check item before the main treatment to filter out inattentive subjects. Subjects who failed to answer this item correctly (17 in 427, 3.98%) were dropped from further analysis.
After the attention check, subjects were randomly assigned into three different groups. In Control Group, subjects were asked to read an election bulletin of legislative election including a KMT and a DPP candidate (see the supplemental materials file). All candidates were male, around 50 years old, and with an average bachelor degree. Each candidate enumerates four policy statements: the former two are related to reform the longterm care health system and housing prices, and the latter two are related to their attitude toward the cross-strait relationship between Taiwan and China -the only dominant issue in Taiwan. Once again, wordings of the policies were copied from real election bulletins in Taiwan. The KMT candidate is designed to express a moderate pro-unification attitude, while the DPP candidate is designed to express a moderate pro-independence attitude.
Subjects in Control Group were asked to read through this electoral bulletin, and use the same 0-100 scale to locate the perceived ideological position of these two candidates.
Respondents were also asked about their vote choice between these two candidates.
In Treatment Group A, an extreme pro-independence candidate from the TSU was To sum up, we can simply compare the group means to estimate the average treatment effect (ATE). To improve the precision of estimation and conduct covariance adjustment given the large size in our sample, we follow the suggestions given by Freedman (2008) and Lin (2013) . We use regression adjustment, which includes demeaned covariates and their interactions with the two treatment dummies, which yields unbiased estimation but improves precision asymptotically. All of the analyses below are calculated and plotted by R 3.1.3, and all codes and data will be publicly replicable on the author's website. To adjust for possible randomization failure from covariates including respondents' socio-demographic background, and owing to the boundary of the scale (0 to 100), we use Tobit regression to estimate the ATE of the entrance of extreme liberal and conservative candidate. vii In Table 3 , the first and the fourth model estimate how the Ext-Lib and ExtCon influences subjects' perceived policy position regarding the moderate liberal and conservative candidate, respectively. In the second, third, fifth, and sixth model, we apply covariance adjustment by adding the interaction term between the two treatments and the demeaned age, gender, educational level, income, race, the importance of religion, and selfreported ideology (before treatment). Also, the third and sixth model only use moderate subjects, which is defined by those who self-reported ideology is relatively moderatebetween 40 and 60 -which accounts for 20.9% of our MTurk samples.
viii [Table 3] The result, generally speaking, is consistent with Figure 1 and supports the range effect theory. The entrance of the extreme conservative candidate Ext-Con would make voters view the Mod-Con candidate as more moderate. The average treatment effect is about -7.3 for all participants, and -18.8 among the ideologically moderate participants! This change is even more significant than the pure policy treatment in the previous study (about 10% in Simonovits (2017) ). ix This result also suggests that the moderate voters will have an extremeness aversion tendency toward the new extreme candidate, and consider the moderate counterpart as much more moderate.
Meanwhile, the effect of Ext-Con on the perceived Mod-Lib candidate is trivial.
In comparison, the impact of the entrance of Ext-Lib is not that clear on the full sample. If we narrow our focus to the moderate participants, the estimated effect of Ext-Lib becomes significant (+10.07, p < 0.1). Apart from the treatment effect, our regression models provide little help on improving the precision of our estimation; comparing model 5 and 6
implies that the standard error of the uncontrolled models do not reduce significantly, which suggests that the randomization process does not fail.
Most importantly, the effects of the two treatments are both asymmetric; the entrance of the extreme liberal candidate only influences participants' attitude toward the moderate liberal one, and the entrance of the extreme conservative candidate only influences the participants' perception toward the moderate conservative counterpart. This asymmetry is consistent with range theory owing to the two-end-point assumption.
Moreover, the policy statements of the two moderate candidates remain the same in the control and treatment group; that is, voters change their perception on the moderate candidate simply because of the entrance of the extreme candidate. Our experimental design helps clarify the causal relationship.
The limited finding for the entrance of Ext-Lib may owe to three reasons. First, our treatment was imperfect. The median value of the perceived Ext-Lib candidate position is 17 in Figure 1 , which is not far from the Mod-Lib. In other words, our treatment is not the most extremely liberal candidate in the eye of our opted-in participants. Table 4 provides some support to the extremeness aversion theory. Among the conservative subjects, the entrance of Ext-Con lowers their support to the moderate conservative candidate from 88% to 73%; the effect of Ext-Lib on Mod-Lib is even larger: from 100% to 37%. It is not surprising that the entrance of radical candidate will split the votes from its moderate counterpart among the voters on the same side.
When it comes to moderate subjects, the entrance of Ext-Con increases moderate voter's support to the Mod-Con candidate (from 27 % to 30%, the colored cell in Table 4 ), but decreases their support toward the Mod-Lib (from 73% to 68%). To some extent, The change is good news to Mod-Con candidate -the extremeness aversion effect helps ModCon narrow the relative strength of Mod-Lib among the moderate voters. However, the change did not appear in the full sample, which may be because the number of moderate voters in our sample is not enough (20.7%).
[ Table 4 ]
Meanwhile, the entrance of Ext-Lib does not help the Mod-Lib nor the Mod-Con candidate in our research design. Instead, the majority of our participants choose to vote for the Ext-Lib in the treatment group. This failure may be attributed to the failed treatment as is shown in Figure 1 . Besides, it can also be the case that all candidates were designed to graduate from a law school located in the southern part of United States. Graduating from a southern university may imply its possibly right-wing position. Another possibility may be from the multidimensionality of the ideology in the U.S. context. Therefore, even though the entrance of extreme candidate may successfully influence voter's perception of the moderate candidate, as is evidenced in Table 3 , their vote choice is worth further exploring.
Study 2: TW Sample and Independence-Unification Spectrum
One weakness in our U.S. experiment is the imperfect treatment which was not strong enough to serve as an "extreme candidate." Indeed, the policy statements used in treatment may have multiple facets, so subject may be framed or may put different weights on each facet. To deal with the issue complexity, we replicated the same experiment in Taiwan, where the independence-unification issue is the only dominant dimension. Under this particular context, we expect to find more unambiguous evidence on range effect in the political arena. Before the analysis, the randomization is checked through ANOVA, as was applied in the study 1. To improve the precision of the estimated ATE, we also use Tobit regression to adjust for covariates. Figure 2 shows how Taiwanese subjects in each group locate the two or three candidates' cross-strait attitudes. The distribution of the two extreme candidate evidence that our manipulations are both effective: the extreme pro-independence candidate from TSU was scored 95.5 as its median, while in the Treatment group B, the extreme prounification NP candidate was scored 3.
[ Figure 2 ]
Once again, Figure 2 illustrates the range effect under the context of Taiwan politics.
Comparing the control group in the first row and the Treatment group A, Taiwanese subjects' perceived policy position of the moderate pro-independence candidate shifted from 71.5 to 65, which is more moderate. Two sample t-test shows that the change in means is significant (p < 0.001). Meanwhile, the subject's perceived policy position of the moderate pro-unification candidate remains unchanged (from 31.5 to 30, p = 0.51). The exact same phenomenon can be found when comparing the control and Treatment group B. The entrance of the extreme pro-unification candidate makes subjects' attitudes toward the moderate one on the same side to be much more moderate (from 31.5 to 38). Two sample t-test shows that the shift is statistically significant (p < 0.001). At the same time, subjects' attitudes toward the moderate pro-independence candidate remain unchanged (from 71.5 to 74, p = 0.92). The result in Figure 2 indicates that the range effect exists in democracy across cultures.
Tobit regression model then is used to estimate the ATE of the Treatment A and B and adjust for covariates (including age, gender, income, level of education, and self-report policy preference before the treatment). Demeaned covariates and their interaction with the two treatments are added to the models. In Table 5 , the first two regression models are subjects' perceived policy position on the moderate pro-independence DPP candidate (Mod-Ind), while the third and fourth regressions are for the moderate pro-unification KMT candidate (Mod-Uni).
Results in Table 5 are consistent with Figure 2 and the predictions of range effect theory. First, the entrance of the extreme pro-independence Ext-Ind TSU candidate make voters view the Mod-Ind candidate as more moderate, but the null effect is found on the Mod-Uni candidate who is on the opposite side of the policy spectrum. Similarly, the entrance of the Ext-Uni NP candidate only makes the Mod-Uni candidate as more moderate, but no effect is found on Mod-Ind. The entry of the extreme candidate asymmetrically influences the image of the moderate candidate on the same side, but not the moderate one on the opposite side, which is predicted by range effect theory. Moreover, the policy statements of the two moderate candidates remain the same in control and treatment group; that is, voters change their perception of the moderate candidate because of the entrance of the extreme counterpart. What's more, in the second and fourth model, covariate adjustment provides little help to improve the estimation of ATE. that the moderate pro-independence candidate lost a lot among the pro-independence supporters, but he also gained some from the moderate voters, which still ensures his winning and meanwhile further marginalizes his main competitor, the moderate prounification candidate (whose support rate dropped from 23% to 12%).
The Motivation of the Mainstream Party: A simulation
In the two experiments, one of our primary weaknesses is that the number of voters in each cell in Table 4 and 6 is very low and skewed, which prevents us from further inference. However, through Tobit analysis in Table 3 and 5, we showed that the entrance of extreme candidate could asymmetrically influence voters' perception of the moderate candidate on the same side. Thus, we should expect to find evidence that the major party will be motivated to allow the entrance of a radical party if we extend the range effect to the whole population. To illustrate the motivation of the major party (such as DPP's willingness to share some seats and votes to the small parties), we combine the clearer result from Taiwanese subjects in Figure 2 (perceived candidate positions), and the proximity voting assumption to simulate the mainstream party's calculation.
In the beginning, voters are assumed to be uniformly distributed in the unificationindependence dimension. Second, the two median values of perceived Mod-Ind and ModUni candidate's position in the first row of Figure 2 (the control group), 31.5 and 71.5, serve as cutting points separating pro-unification, moderate, and pro-independence voters.
Third, we simulate the number of moderate voters from 0% to 100%, and the number of pro-unification and pro-independence voters are proportional to the lengths. We assume that all voters follow the proximity paradigm, indicating that they will vote for the candidate closer to them in the policy spectrum (Tomz and Van Houweling 2008) . For example, when all voters are moderate voters, the Mod-Ind candidate can gain 50% of votes; when no voter is moderate, the Mod-Ind candidate can gain all votes on the right side of her, indicating100% × 100−71.5 100−71.5+31.5 = 47.5%.
When the Ext-Ind candidate chooses to join the competition, we use the result in the second row of Figure 2 to estimate the change of vote share among all candidates. In particular, the focus is on how the entrance of Ext-Ind influences the vote share of ModInd, the moderate candidate on the same side of the political spectrum, under different numbers of moderate voters. Figure 3 shows the simulation of Mod-Ind candidate's vote share under different numbers of moderate voters in the district, based on the result of Figure 2 and the assumption of proximity voting. When there is no Ext-Ind candidate, the Mod-Ind candidate can earn 47.5% to 50% of the vote--she can, at most, tie the election and may lose to Mod-Uni candidate in most possible scenarios. However, when the Ext-Ind candidate jumps into the election, the Mod-Ind candidate will be perceived as much more moderate, and she can earn more votes from the moderate voters. In this simulation, when the number of moderate voters exceeds 82%, the Mod-Ind candidate has the motivation to allow the Ext-Ind candidate running in the election strategically. When almost all voters are moderate, the Mod-Ind candidate can gain 56% of votes after Ext-Ind candidate emerged.
[ 
Conclusion and Discussion
Results in our survey experiments in both the United States and Taiwan suggest that range effect exists when people are interpreting political information and making voting decisions, especially in the SMD elections. Once an extreme candidate enters the electoral battleground, voters would subjectively relocate the perceived policy position of the moderate candidate on the same side of the political spectrum to a more moderate position. In the two survey experiments, the two moderate candidates have the same policy manifesto in the control and treatment groups, which rules out the alternative explanation that the moderate candidate actively moves their policy position to attract moderate voters and to prevent the emergence of the extreme parties. Moreover, we find that subject's perception of the moderate candidate on the opposite side remains unchanged, which implies that voters indeed change their perception to the intermediate option rather than change the way they scale every option. The asymmetric impact supports the two-endpoint model used in the range effect theory and is consistent with the recent studies in political science with different political settings.
The range effect has important implications for the study of political behavior. First of all, our results consolidate the psychological foundation for our argument on the mainstream party's strategy. In the last part of the previous section, we provide simulation based on experiment result to show that the major party has the motivation to strategically allow its extreme counterpart to run in the election, especially when the number of moderate voters is large enough. The mainstream party (or the moderate major candidate)
can strategically foster or repress its radical counterpart running in the election in order to change its own perceived policy position, even without changing its policy platform. It is costly for a party to shift policy positions on major issues because it may be perceived as inconsistent or even dishonest (Tavits 2007) ; changing policy may also be harmful to intraparty politics. xiv However, by manipulating the range effect, the mainstream party can apparently make itself seem closer to the moderate median point on the ideological spectrum by doing nothing; that is, by not blocking radical candidates. In this scenario, the radical wing competitor is not a drag but becomes part of the strategy for the mainstream Third, ironically, the range effect is, to some extent, beneficial to the function of democracy. The emergence of radical wing parties may indeed reflect the voice of extreme supporters, but the existence of such extreme options also indirectly makes the mainstream party more popular among the moderate voters. Therefore, the mainstream party would have more bargaining power through election results to rebalance the potential influence of the radical wing parties. Also, it may help explain why holding the primary may help the party's chance of winning the general election (Adams et al. 2008 ). Adams and his colleagues suggest that the primary improves the campaign skills of the candidates, while our study suggests that the competition between the extreme and moderate nominees can make the moderate one more attractive to the moderate voters, which would be vital to winning the general election.
Fourth, our study also contributes to the study of consumer psychology. Our two experiments reveal a clear tendency of range effect -the extreme counterpart will influence people's judgment on the moderate candidate. However, the effect of the extremeness aversion -that is, people will avoid the extreme option -is not very clear in the vote choices (Table 4 and 6). The reason behind this weak finding is simple: some voters are also ideologically extreme. Therefore, they need not avoid the extreme candidate. In other words, whether the extremeness aversion will appear is determined by the interplay between the characteristics of the options and the consumers.
The next step of this research project can be fivefold. First, we aim at collecting samples from representative pools of subjects so that we could examine if the same range effect also exists among the public. Second, our experimental design did not fit the (closed) primary election in the United States and only explore one possible direction that the entrance of the extreme candidate may influence voters' perception.
Third, in our survey experiment, we simplify the treatment by adding only one politically extreme party in SMD. What would happen if there were both the extreme left and extreme right-wing candidates entering into the election? Waismel-Manor and
Simonovits (2017) had tested the range effect in the setting of PR with multiple candidates.
We will try to build up models and arguments for such complexity. Fourth, as is suggested by Feldman and Johnston (2014) , the number of dimensions in the U.S. public may be two rather than one. Even though we merely focused on the major left-right spectrum which dominates the politicians in the U.S. and the independence-unification spectrum that dominates in the Taiwan politics, it would be theoretically interesting to explore the effect of the newly emerged salient issues in or out of the existing spectrum, or the effect of a We thank Herbert Kistchelt, Jake Bowers, Eric C. C. Chang, John Aldrich, Erik R. Tillman,
Emerson Niou, and Kuan-chen Lee for their helpful comments. We also thank the three anonymous reviewers for their constructive suggestions throughout the review process. All errors are our own.
ii The concept of extreme party we focus here is different from a niche party (Meguid 2005 ). Table 3 and contingent   table analysis in Table 4 . Fourth, the main result in Table 3 did not change if we applied a different definition of moderate. For example, if the range is redefined as 42-58 (n=92), the effect size of Ext-Lib in the model 3 in Table 3 will become 12.75 (p<0.05). If 38-62 (n=144), the effect size will become 7.43 (p < 0.1). We really appreciate Reviewer 2 for asking for the clarification.
ix Regarding the effect size and the required sample size, since the average treatment effect is about 7.3 points, and the pooled standard deviation for the moderate conservative candidates is 18.3, 99.6 subjects in each group are needed to reach the 80% power, and 133 are needed for 90% power. If we have taken into account for the 10 point effect size in the previous study (Simonovits 2017) , the number of subject needed to reach 80% and 90%
power should be 53.5 and 71.3, respectively. Therefore, the number of subject collected in the U.S. sample (n=100 in the treatment group) is not unsatisfied.
x Once again, the ATE shown in Table 5 mitigates the threat of power. The two treatment effects are about 7.5 points, and the pooled standard deviation for the moderate candidates are 15.6 for DPP and 16.0 for KMT. Therefore, 68.9 and 91.2 subjects are needed to reach 80% and 90% power, both of which are smaller than the number assigned to the treatment groups (110 for Ext-Ind and 119 for Ext-Uni, respectively).
xi The definition of moderates, 40-60 used in the US case, cannot be applied here. The range will leave two few sample for analysis (n=48). When the 31.5-71.5 is applied, the number of moderate voters becomes 107, which is very close to the number in the US case and fits minimum requirement for power analysis (see footnote 8) and the contingency (2008) found that people did not systematically follow the policy change of their attached party, nor did they adjust their loyalty. Instead, they only systematically update their subjective perceptions among the parties.
xv However, the opposite effect is found among new democracies because mainstream parties have not occupied a certain policy position on the spectrum. 
